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Innovation within the Australian  wine industry is at a crossroads. More specifically, 
under the influence of fundamental change, the objectives, extension and uptake of 
research and development (R&D) within the industry’s current innovation framework 
are being subjected to rather schizophrenic forces. 
At one level, industry organizations are directing the R&D agenda from within a 
national, ‘Brand Australia’  context.  At another level, the firms being serviced by these 
organizations are demanding region-specific R&D extension in response to global pres- 
sure for differentiation and products at higher price-points. 
This  paper explores these contradictory forces and the degree to which they signal an 
emergence of innovation lock-in within the industry.  It also proposes a model for the 





Between the early  1980s  and the new  millen- 
nium, the Australian  wine  industry had 
transformed itself from a domestic-oriented, 
cottage-style industry into a leading producer, 
exporter and innovator of table wine. The cen- 
tralization of resources and funding,  together 
with   a  nationally focused   R&D programme, 
was a model that worked exceptionally well  in 
this transformation. It united  a fragmented 
industry with disparate objectives and markets 
to create a growth organization focused  on a 
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Australia’ (GWRDC, 2004). The foundation of 
‘Brand Australia’  was  a blended wine  product 
targeted at the  popular-premium  segment  of 
the  market. It was  technically faultless, fruit- 
driven  and provided value  for money. The 
industry’s national R&D programme delivered 
this product consistently to a market  in which 
it was rapidly gaining share and within two 
decades, Australian  wine  dominated the 
popular-premium price-points in both the UK 
and US markets  (MacQuitty, 2006). 
Over the last six to seven  years,  however, a 
very different  wine  landscape has been emerg- 
ing. A dramatic escalation in merger and acqui- 
sition   activity  within  the   global    industry 
is creating a new  operating paradigm. 
Compounding industry rationalization at  the 






A very different wine 





alliances have  undermined traditional bound- 
aries,  rendering national strategies less than 
effective (Aylward, 2005). Once national icons 
in both New and Old World  sectors  may now 
be subsidiaries of international conglomerates. 
Examples  of this include California’s Beringer 
Wines being  swallowed by Australia’s Fosters 
Group and France’s Pernod Ricard consuming 
Australia’s Wyndham Estate as well  as Britain’s 
Allied Domecq and New Zealand’s Montana 
Estate. On an even  larger  scale  there  is the US 
giant Constellation Wines  which has absorbed 
Australia’s BRL Hardy,  Canada’s Vincorp, 
California’s  Mondavi,   together  with   40%  of 
Italy’s  Ruffino Wines  while establishing a 
distribution alliance with  France’s  famous 
Rothschild (Sands,  2006). 
The scale  of this  rationalization has  largely 
been in response to the ‘commodification’ of 
wine. Economies  of scale,  streamlined distrib- 
ution,  multiple production sites and geo- 
graphically diversified vineyards and  markets 
are all ingredients in what has become a global 
wine  lake. A firm such  as Constellation, for 
example, can source grapes  and wine  from its 
Canadian  subsidiary to  service bulk  and 
popular-premium price-points and from its 
Australian  subsidiary to service popular- 
premium and  super-premium price-points — 
and  from its Californian subsidiary to service 
the super-premium and icon price-points. 
Similarly, it may use its Italian and French 
connections to service primarily European 
markets   while it  orients   its  Australian, 
Canadian  and  Californian subsidiaries  to 
service  New   World   markets  — or,   in   fact, 
cross-subsidize  deficiencies   in   one   market 
with   surpluses from  another   (Sands,   2006). 
Such  flexibility is critical to a firm of its size 
and of course  ensures competitive advantage. 
What this flexibility also demonstrates, 
however, is the extent to which the Australian 
and  other  national wine  industries have 
become subordinate to global  forces.  Once 
simple  operating paradigms structured along 
national   agendas   and   priorities   are   now 
subject to a myriad  of competing and often 
conflicting pressures. These  pressures also 
require rapid,  flexible and differentiated 
responses, particularly in the arenas  of R&D 




The global–local nexus 
 
Paradoxically, the  continuing  globalization of 
the wine  industry has, in turn, created an 
amalgam of local  and regional linkages. While 
national agendas face at least partial  decom- 
missioning, local  and  regional wine   clusters 
have been rediscovered as providers of the 
differentiation now  being  demanded (Taplin, 
2006). Increasingly educated consumers are 
graduating through a  series   of  rising   price- 
points  and demanding heritage and a product 
story. They are also demanding a noticeable 
departure  from  the  blended,  somewhat 
nomadic wine  styles  that flood the popular- 
premium  price-points (Wittwer,  2006).  The 
net  result  is  a product that  provides a clear 
point-of-difference,  but  there   is  far  more  to 
the  story  (Sanders, 2005). Local and  regional 
differentiation begins  with  region-specific 
R&D, branding, infrastructure, marketing and 
distribution. 
Regional  wine  clusters within the Australian 
industry should  be ideally placed to navigate 
the  global  wine   landscape. In  a  number   of 
cases    they    have   developed  strong    brand 
images through the pursuit  of wine  quality and 
consumer-driven styles.  Firms within these 
clusters are attempting to target niche  markets 
in both on- and off-licence segments. Through 
a critical mass of regulatory bodies, suppliers, 
growers, funding  agencies and the wine  firms 
themselves, the most developed regional clus- 
ters are securing a high level  of infrastructure 
and   integration.  In  addition,  the   ability   to 
secure flexible distribution channels has long 
been  a success story  within New World  wine 
clusters (Aylward, 2004,  2006a). 
  
 
Emerging  innovation lock-in 
 
Ironically, it is Australia’s historical success in 
R&D that is now  hampering the drive  for dif- 
ferentiation. This paper  argues  that the indus- 
try’s  previous success in delivering a national 
R&D agenda  has  created a path  dependency 
from  which stakeholders are  now  finding  it 
difficult  to deviate (Aylward, 2006a). Moving 
from a centralized operating paradigm to one 
of multiple levels  and variations has proved 
difficult for such a culturally homogenized 
industry. Furthermore, forms of innovation 
lock-in  and  inertia   are  now   emerging  as  a 
response to discordant priorities between 
regional wine  firms and the industry organiza- 
tions by which they are serviced (Aylward, 
forthcoming; Croser,  2006). 
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In line with  their mandate, the national 
industry organizations continue to prioritize 
and fund R&D extension along  national 
pathways. In terms  of advances in viticulture 
management, quality standards, branding and 
product  development,  the   agenda   is  most 
often  set  using  generic national benchmarks 
and based  to a large  degree upon  the require- 
ments  of Australia’s major  wine  firms (inter- 
views, 2005). Even the recently established 
regional  extension  programmes  draw 
inevitably on the  expertise of central bodies 
and personnel due to their centralized control 
(GWRDC, 2005). While  regional associations 
are  in existence and  should  logically manage 
these  regional R&D priorities, their inability to 
access central resources means  they  also lack 
the  personnel and  expertise required to run 
these  programmes. In addition, very  few 
regional representatives sit on the central 
decision-making committees. 
The  voice   of  regional  petitions  in  many 
cases  is simply  not heard.  When  it is granted 
attention, the response is often an inappro- 
priately generic one. The national ‘Brand 
Australia’  approach to  internationalization  of 
the  wine  industry remains focused  on satisfy- 
ing the need for product consistency and value 
within the popular-premium price-points. The 
approach of wine  firms to this  same  interna- 
tionalization is increasingly one of single- 
vineyard, differentiated and regionally branded 
products that satisfy growing demands within 
niche  price-points of the more developed 
markets. This gap  between what  is requested 
and what  is supplied will  continue to widen. 
As long  as the  two  principal stakeholders — 
industry  organizations and  firms — perceive 
and  respond to different  pressures, their  gap 
in priorities will increasingly tend towards a 
unique form of innovation inertia. 
Using empirical data from a recent industry- 
wide  survey, the paper  highlights the discord 
in these  imperatives and suggests that,  in the 
quest  for greater regional identity, niche  pro- 
duction and  targeting of higher  price-points, 




The Australian wine industry: 
the  current innovation landscape 
 
In 2006,  the Australian  wine  industry has 
approximately 2000  participating firms,  with 
166,000 hectares under   vine  producing 1.4 
billion litres of beverage wine. It is the world’s 
fourth  largest  exporter and  dominates the 
popular-premium price-points in  the  two 
largest  wine  markets  — the  UK and  the  USA 
— as well as representing approximately 8% of 
the global  wine  trade  (Winetitles, 2006). 
Structurally, the  industry is populated by a 
small number  of large conglomerates and 
approximately 1980 micro,  small and medium- 
sized  firms. These  firms are concentrated in a 
number  of regions within four of Australia’s 
states — New  South  Wales,  Victoria,  Western 
Australia and Victoria. The regions of South 
Australia  make  up  what  is  often  referred to 
as  the  industry’s dominant wine  cluster 
(Aylward, 2005). Infrastructure and  resource 
planning   within   the    industry   is    highly 
  
 
centralized in comparison to other  New  and 
Old  World   wine   industries. The  Grape  and 
Wine Research and Development Corporation 
(GWRDC) is at the centre of this structure as 
the industry’s intermediary body,  that collects 
R&D levies  and government funding,  deter- 
mines R&D priorities, resource allocation and, 
ultimately, industry vision  and strategy. There 
is also the Australian Wine Research Institute 
(AWRI),  which conducts the  majority of the 
industry’s research, the Cooperative Research 
Centre for Viticulture (CRCV), which conducts 
viticultural research, the Australian  Wine  and 
Brandy Corporation (AWBC), which controls 
information, promotes and regulates the 
industry and  the  Winemakers’ Federation  of 
Australia  (WFA), which sponsors strategic and 
promotional  issues   (Winemakers’ Federation 
of Australia,  2006). These,  together with  a 
number  of other national organizations, are 
located  within  the   South   Australian    wine 
cluster (Winetitles, 2006). 
In terms  of R&D, the  industry’s centraliza- 
tion was a key component in its transition from 
domestic to international status.  Industry  orga- 
nizations such  as the  GWRDC, the AWBC and 
the WFA have  been  key  players in the  indus- 
try’s ‘2025  vision’. This original article of policy 
and operation, introduced in 1995,  focused  on 
growing Australia’s exports in quantity and 
quality through the national extension of R&D 
(GWRDC,  2004).  It  was   implemented  in  a 
period   of  embryonic  internationalization  for 
the  industry and  has  become a  mandate for 
these  organizations. As a result,  vision  and 
response to changing environments is deter- 
mined   by  a  mantle   of  national  rather   than 
regional priorities. As mentioned earlier, these 
priorities are increasingly in discord  with those 
of a growing number  of firms whose mandates 





Interpretations of innovation lock-in 
or  inertia 
 
There  are  many  interpretations of the  above. 
One of the more  pronounced theories is that 
offered  by Hannan  et al. (2004), who  define 
inertia  as ‘A  persistent organizational resis- 
tance to changing architecture’. They  argue 
that structural and architectural inertia  have 
deterministic qualities, that they  emerge 
through a Darwinian type  of natural  selection 
and  that  the  longer  the  organization survives 
the more  static  it becomes. Maintaining an 
approximate  status   quo  saves   organizations 
from exposing themselves to abrupt  variations 
or directional change and thereby reduces the 
risk of mortality (Hannan and Freeman,  1984). 
The derivative argument is that inertia  main- 
tains  organizational linkages, internal dynam- 
ics, hierarchical and operational legitimacy, as 
well  as structural arrangements that have 
evolved  over time.  If substantial internal or 
external  pressure  is  applied to  any  one  of 
these  factors,  an uncertain path is created 
(Hannan  et al., 2004;  Ruef,  2004). Theorists 
such  as  Greenwood and  Hinings  (1996) 
contend  that  the  institutional  environment, 
with  its cultural, social  and  business ‘norms’, 
applies an architectural straightjacket to the 
average organization. Breaking  from such a 
straightjacket may expose the organization to 
cultural isolation  or ex-communication, which 
again  increases the risk of mortality. A further 
degree of complexity is  added  by  DiMaggio 
and  Powell  (1991), who  contend that  highly 
structured organizations provide  a context 
within which efforts to deal  with  uncertainty 
in a rational  manner  invariably lead  to greater 
uniformity. Rational decision-making is a value 
created by the environment within which the 
organization operates and one  that  inevitably 
encourages homogeneity as the organizational 
environment evolves. 
Brown (2002) is less sympathetic to this 
theory.  He  argues   that  a  lack  of  change  is 
equally detrimental to an organization and that 
inertia  can and does create significant liability. 
Conservative action  in the face of change may 
protect the organization in the short term but 
by not implementing the  change required to 
compete within new  and changing environ- 
ments it is exposed to often overpowering 
pressures. However, Brown (2002) also 
contends that  when  an organization makes  a 
  
 
radical  and successful change, others  tend  to 
follow  and over  time  institutionalize that 
change. This not only  creates clear  pathways 
for future change but also helps  eliminate 
resistance to it. 
The   theory    is   reinforced   by   Genschel 
(1997), who  states that ‘The avoidance of dis- 
ruptions in the near future may lock actors 
into developmental  pathways which  lead 
into dead ends and thus cause disruptions in 
the distant future’. Further,  organizations that 
favour lock-in or inertia at a time when  their 
industry sector  may be experiencing radical 




The innovation perspective of inertia 
 
Embedded   within  the  organizational  frame- 
work  is the innovation-based theory  of inertia 
(Pierson, 2000). Due to what Anderson (2005) 
refers to as the co-evolution of technology, 
institutions and organizations, with  institu- 
tions  providing the  background conditioning 
for   innovation,   the   emergence  of   inertia 
within this domain  is almost predetermined 
(Lundvall,  1988). When  industry participants 
follow   conservative  organizational  pathways 
in order to limit various forms of risk, their 
structural, behavioural and innovative frame- 
works    tend   to   imitate    this   conservatism. 
Within  the innovation domain,  this is referred 
to as lock-in or path dependency. Firms, orga- 
nizations and industry sectors  can be prone  to 
a condition whereby previous innovation 
success creates habitual pathways. The more 
historically  successful  the  industry  and  the 
more  pronounced its  operational  pathways, 
the more risk-averse its frameworks and the 





The more historically 
successful the industry the 
more likely the legacy of 
lock-in 
Innovation  lock-in,  while offering  a veneer 
of protection to existing systems  in the shorter 
term,  tends to create barriers to more sustain- 
able  innovation (Foxon  and  Pearson,   2006). 
The argument by Pierson  (2000) that  institu- 
tions   are  ‘particularly prone to increasing 
returns’ reinforces the  fatal  attraction of this 
lock-in and the cultural configurations that 
become established. Once a successful recipe 
has  been   found,  no  matter   how  dated  that 
recipe eventually becomes, institutions are 
reluctant to experiment elsewhere. This bias is 
probably most  applicable to  process innova- 
tions  such  as R&D extension, wherein 
established routes,  mechanisms, personnel, 
methods and models  of extension that have 
supported innovative leaps  in the  past  create 
habitual pathways. These  pathways become 
entrenched within the institutional culture of 
the  industry and  create their  own  legitimacy 
through continued use and acceptance. Devi- 
ating from such pathways can be problematic. 
It can  be  expensive, the  risks  of failure  are 
greater and the returns  are unpredictable 
(Hannan    and    Freeman,    1984).  A   simple 
analogy  is  the  desire   to  remain   on  a  well- 
trodden walking track  rather  than explore the 
virgin forest on either  side. Cutting a new path 
through the forest may indeed lead to more 
interesting places, but  the  effort  involved is 
considerable. Although  the  well-trodden path 
provides no new  views  or points  of interest, it 
is easy  and predictable. In this lies the veneer 
of protection and security. 
By not  deviating, however, R&D pathways 
of extension in any  evolving industry implic- 
itly fail to service all but a homogenized clien- 
tele   (Ditter,   2005).  As  such,   differentiated 
users   of  R&D  with   differentiated  require- 
ments represent an increasingly dissatisfied 
customer base. As they  react  to disparate 
markets   that  demand   unique products from 
niche    production  systems,  the   underlying 
R&D system  fails to support their  needs. The 
R&D imperatives of the  service provider and 
those  of  its  non-homogenized  clientele 
become dislocated. It is this dislocation or gap 






Using  data  from  165  firms  within the  Aus- 
tralian  wine  industry, the paper  reports  on the 
perceived importance of regional R&D exten- 
sion   in  the   development  of  differentiated, 
locally branded products. It also reports  on 
perceptions  of  an  emerging  dislocation 
between the R&D imperatives of wine  organi- 
zations and those of the firms they service. The 
hypothesis presented here  is that in the indus- 
try’s  current climate of complex change from 
national systems  to those reflecting global  and 
local nexi  of production, distribution and mar- 
keting, there  has emerged an industry-level 
R&D inertia  that  transcends simple  organiza- 
tional  or institutional domains. 
Deriving  from  this  hypothesis is  the  argu- 
ment that for long-term sustainability and 
reputation the Australian  wine  industry must 
organize its R&D extension to reflect  the 
growing demand  for higher  price-point, 






This study focuses  on the industry’s R&D 
extension  (innovation) and  its  potential 
barrier  to regional, differentiated identity. The 
role  and  effectiveness of the  industry organi- 
zations  are  therefore addressed as  firms  are 
asked to comment on a range of industry R&D 
initiatives and  their  implications. The  survey 
was  conducted between June  2005  and  Feb- 
ruary 2006, it was perception-based and exclu- 
sively used responses from 165 micro and SME 
firms. The research has also drawn  on findings 
of the author’s previous empirical studies  to 
provide  context and substantiation of findings 
(Aylward, 2004,  2005,  2006a). 
Wine firms, as the primary users of the 
industry’s R&D, provided the  survey  sample 
for this research. A randomized, size-stratified 
methodology was chosen for this sampling 
(Harrison   et  al., 1996). Care  was   taken   to 
ensure a similar  number  of firms from each  of 
the   four  chosen  states,   New   South  Wales, 
South Australia, Western Australia  and Victoria, 
were  captured. In  addition,  only  exporting 
firms  were included in the  survey  and  again 
care was taken to include equal representation 
from the diverse regions within each  state.  In 
each  case,  either  the  CEO or production 
manager was the respondent. Surveys were 
conducted by telephone, which resulted in a 
high   response  rate   of  approximately  75% 
being  achieved. In addition  to the survey 
instrument, in-depth  interviews were carried 
out with  a subset  of firms whose initial  survey 
responses provided valuable qualitative data 





Establishing  a context for the  hypothesis pre- 
sented  here, surveyed firms were initially asked 
about the generic importance of regional iden- 
tity to their firm’s marketing and operational 
success, as well as their product’s reputation in 
domestic and  international markets. Overall, 
91% (148)  of firms believed that  this  identity 
was either  critical or very important to these 
activities. A number  of those  involved in the 
in-depth  interview section of the study 
commented that regional or local  identity is a 
notion  with  which New World  industries are 
still coming to terms but one that is culturally 
embedded within most European  wine  indus- 
tries. Their view is that the development of 
regional infrastructure with localized planning, 
coordination, distribution and marketing 
requires  an  entirely  new   thinking  process. 
Wine needs  to be understood as a value-adding 
process that blends  art and science in a unique 
and highly  desirable way. The Europeans,  they 
argue,  understand this and practice it to their 
advantage, while most  New World  industries 
still  view  wine  with  an industrialist mentality 
as little  more than a commodity. 
Reinforcing this view, only 33% of surveyed 
firms believed that  industry organizations 
within the Australian  wine  sector  placed 
importance on regional identity or differentia- 
tion. The perception was most apparent in the 
isolated  regions of Western Australia,  where a 
mere 23% of firms believed that industry orga- 
nizations were servicing or even  understand- 
ing their  interests. 
  
 
Underlining the call for greater regional 
identity is the growing pressure to create a 
point-of-difference in product and marketing. 
Global distributors and consumers are becom- 
ing  more  sophisticated in  their  approach  to 
wine and are looking beyond the Australian 
guarantee of consistency and value for money. 
There   is  pressure  to  produce  and   market 
wines with  individual stories,  heritage and  a 
legitimate  claim   on   terroir    (Brook,   2000; 
Croser,  2004). In terms  of sustainability it is 
also   critical  for  the  Australian   industry  to 
discard   its  reputation  for  bland  ‘industrial’ 
wine   by  targeting  higher   price-points with 
low-yield, high-quality products that  are  indi- 
vidually crafted. Of the surveyed firms, 87% 
claimed that  such  differentiation was  integral 
to their sustained competitiveness. An equal 
number  believed it was also integral to the 
sustainability of the industry. Further,  they 
believed that it was inextricably linked  to 
regional  and   local   identity.   However,  this 
‘point-of-difference’ is currently antithetical to 
the  generic ‘Brand  Australia’  approach being 
adhered to by the industry organizations with 
which, it is interesting to note,  only  26% of 
firms are in agreement. 
 
 
Regional extension of R&D or 
innovation lock-in? 
 
According to the  surveyed firms the  national 
‘Brand  Australia’  campaign is  intrinsically 
linked  with  R&D priorities and  therefore has 
significant implications for extension of that 
R&D. Legislated under  the articles of the 
GWRDC, the industry’s R&D is formulated to 
achieve the  greatest return  on investment.  In 
other  words, these  guidelines are dictated by 
the  most common  need,  the  ability  to under- 
take  the  research and  greatest return  in out- 
comes  (GWRDC, 2004). They  also reflect  the 
industry’s  generic   marketing  strategy.  The 
focus is primarily on national viticultural man- 
agement  in  the   pursuit   of  a  product  that 
is disease-free, is of consistent quality, is 
technically  acceptable,  is  blended  from 
multiple regions, represents value  for money 
and   is  of  instant,   age-free   appeal.  Such   a 
product appropriately targets  the popular- 
premium price-points that Australia dominates 
and,  according to the  industry bodies, repre- 
sents  the  best  return  financially, even  though 
much  of that return  belongs  to overseas 
interests. 
The strategy does, however, do little for 
building Australia’s reputation as a fine  wine 
producer or supplier. The majority of surveyed 
firms believe that in order  to create differenti- 
ated products, differentiated R&D is essential. 
Whether it is canopy management, disease 
control, soil analysis, irrigation, pest  manage- 
ment  or rootstock development, firms  argue 
that these  are region-specific problems requir- 
ing   region-specific  solutions.  Instead,   solu- 
tions  tend  to come  in a prefabricated format 
that often fails to address  individual concerns 
but   reflects  classical  lock-in   characteristics 
(Park and Lee, 2004). 
Despite the fact that appropriate R&D 
extension is viewed by operators as a pre- 
requisite to the creation of regionally branded 
networks and as an indicator of the industry’s 
research breadth, only  21% believed that  the 
industry organizations were addressing these 
issues.  As one  firm CEO stated,  ‘There  needs 
to be more industry consultation prior to 
setting agendas from everyone, not just the 
big boys’. This sentiment is reinforced by inno- 
vation theorists such as Boschma  (2004), who 
contends that there  is substantial risk of insti- 
tutional  lock-in when  policy reflects the inter- 
ests  of the  dominant players rather  than  an 
open   system   where  it  is  directed  by  new 
players and economic renewal. 
It appears that this sentiment was fairly 
uniform  among  firms,  with  widespread calls 
for decentralization of R&D. Currently the 
AWRI, which conducts the vast majority of the 
industry’s  research,  is  based   in  Adelaide   at 
the heart  of the South Australian  wine  cluster. 
This centralization of research of course 
underscores the generic, one-size-fits-all ap- 
proach  and perpetuates the discordant imper- 
atives   between  organizations and   firms.   It 
also  fits neatly  within Park  and  Lee’s  (2004) 
‘exploitation’ model,  where the  orthodox 
technological  framework  is  retained  at  the 
  
 
expense of a possibly more compatible but 
exploratory one. 
A majority of firms (70% of those  surveyed) 
suggest that a more  appropriate research 
structure would   be  one  in  which the  AWRI 
hub  remained  at  Adelaide   in  the  dominant 
wine   cluster but  with   appropriately  funded 
and resourced ‘nodes’ within each of the indus- 
try’s other  major wine  regions. In fact, 76% of 
the  surveyed  firms  believe  participation  in 
these ‘regional nodes’ was critical to their 
competitive advantage, an issue that will be 






Regions  and  reputation 
 
Supporting regional R&D extension is about 
providing a research foundation to regional 
production, branding, marketing, distribution 
and  most  of all,  identity. It is, therefore, also 
about  supporting those  operators who  follow 
the  path  of  differentiation and  sell  into  the 
higher  super-premium and icon price-points 
where a wine’s heritage and  story  are  essen- 
tial ingredients (Sanders, 2005). While  the 
higher  price-points represent a far smaller  per- 
centage of the overall  market, it is the sector, 
as Brian Croser  (2006) states,  in which repu- 
tations  are  made.  Such  reputations serve  not 
only the individual firm or even the region  but 
the entire  industry. Industries that dominate 
these  price-points are  recognized as  produc- 
ing high-quality brands  (Brook,  2000). 
The ‘reputation-making’ strategy is  evident 
in France’s  Bordeaux region, which is known 
internationally as producing the world’s finest 
wine. The irony  is that,  of Bordeaux’s 20,000 
producers, less than 60 are AOC classified and 
produce wines in  the  icon  price-points. The 
remaining producers create often mediocre 
products that sell in the popular-premium and 
bulk wine  price-points of $A1–$A12  per litre. 
It is the 60 AOC producers, however, that have 
given Bordeaux and France their fine wine  rep- 
utations  (Echikson,  2004). While  New World 
producers such as Australia are dominating the 
popular-premium price-points of international 
markets, their neglect of the higher  categories 
has  earned them  a reputation for producing 
only  popular-premium wine. This lack  of dif- 
ferentiation has  created rigid  perception  bar- 
riers so that currently, as the popular-premium 
price-points  become  further   exposed  to  a 
global    surplus,  Australian    wine    firms   are 
finding  it almost  impossible to break  into the 
higher, niche  categories. In marketing terms 
this is referred to as ‘upward stretch’, reflect- 
ing the difficulty  in convincing consumers that 
a reputation at one  product quality level  can 
be applicable to product quality at a much 
higher  level. 
 
 
The non-regional approach 
 
Generic  marketing strategies such  as ‘Brand 
Australia’  serve  to reinforce these  barriers by 
indicating to the world  that all Australian  wine 
comes  from  the  same  barrel.   Compounding 
the   perception  is   the   industry’s  apparent 
desire    to   remain    focused    exclusively   on 
the  popular-premium category despite its 
increased competition, reduced margins  and 
capacity  to  undermine  reputation.  For 
example, the  latest  industry figures  confirm 
that  export value  continues to  drop  in  this 
sector. Although  the Australian  industry has 
exceeded targets  in volume  exported, dollar 
value  has fallen from US$13.87/gallon in 2001 
to US$11/gallon  in 2006.  Further,  in the  fine 
wine    category  of   US$21/gallon    or   more, 
volume  has dropped by a significant 41%. As 
Brian Croser  (2006) so eloquently states: 
 
Both Australia  and  America eventually 
need to establish recognition of their fine 
wines at the same elevation and to the 
same extent as France. Faced with a supply 
induced global race to the bottom, success 
in the branded commodity wine business 
is not enough to sustain a mature prof- 
itable position as a supplier of wine in the 
global wine business. 
 
Industry  organizations, however, still  see  this 
popular segment as producing the greatest 
return  for the investment dollar. What must be 
  
 
questioned is a strategy that continues to focus 
on an increasingly difficult price-point while 
neglecting  the   substantial  returns   from  an 
image  of quality, differentiation and fine wine 
reputation that only the high price-points can 
deliver. Such discordant strategies and their 
R&D requirements contribute to  the  inertial 
tendencies now  being  witnessed (interviews, 
GWRDC & WFA representatives, 2005). 
Direct   and   relevant  comparisons  can   be 
drawn   between the  current ‘Brand  Australia’ 
strategy and  a mass  market  strategy adopted 
by  one  of Australia’s largest  wine  firms, 
between the 1970s  and early  1990s.  Although 
this  firm  had  a long  history  of wine-making 
and   renowned  expertise,  it  chose   in   this 
period  to  focus  exclusively on  satisfying the 
mass market, namely  bulk and popular cate- 
gories.  For two and a half decades it produced 
large volumes  of acceptable but bland wine  for 
the  mass  market   at  home  and  abroad.  The 
product was  cheap and reliable but only  ever 
considered appropriate for parties  and less dis- 
cerning clientele. The firm, however, never 
pretended to be  anything other  than  a mass- 
market  supplier and it was a strategy that 
remained profitable throughout the Australian 
industry’s early  years  of maturity. The scenario 
was very similar to that of the industry-level 
approach today,  which is to focus  exclusively 
on that segment of the market  currently deliv- 
ering  the greatest returns. 
By  the  mid-1990s,  the  international wine 
industry and its clientele had matured consid- 
erably. Bulk wine  was no longer  the preferred 
beverage of the  masses,  not even  for parties. 
The firm’s  sales  were falling  sharply, margins 
were being  squeezed and profits were shrink- 
ing.  The  new  strategy was  to  move  substan- 
tially ‘upmarket’. The firm’s years  of expertise 
and  knowledge were drawn   upon  to  create 
good-to-excellent wines of distinction for the 
premium and super-premium categories. Pro- 
duction was  reconfigured from mass  produc- 
tion of bulk wine  to smaller, batch  lots of the 
new  product. After ten years  of this new  strat- 
egy  and  despite making  excellent wines that 
have attracted many awards, the firm still 
struggles to shake  its former  reputation. Con- 
sumers have memories of what the name once 
signified   and  to  some  degree still  stigmatize 
the products. Only through perseverance and 
intense  marketing  campaigns  is   the   firm 
slowly bringing about  a change in consumer 
culture and  acceptance. At an industry level, 
many argue that the Australian wine sector is 
repeating this  flawed   strategy by  sacrificing 
long-term   reputation  for   short-term   profit, 
even  as other  New World industries make  the 
transition (Croser, 2006;  Sydney  Morning 
Herald, 2006). It is a strategy, of course, which 
closely represents Genschel’s (1997) inertial 
model:  ‘The  avoidance of disruptions in the 
near future may lock actors into develop- 





A recent study  of the  Californian wine  indus- 
try  discovered that  even  in the  strongly 
branded  Napa  Valley   region,  which  critics 
often refer to as the ‘Walled City of Napa’, pro- 
ducers are changing their strategy to target the 
higher  price-points. As one  CEO in the  study 
stated: 
 
I have concentrated on improving the 
quality, raising the price and building our 
reputation as a high quality producer of 
some different varietals. I wanted to avoid 
us falling into the trap of focussing too 
much attention on satisfying the low price 
consumer instead moving us more upmar- 
ket  where our wines are better positioned. 
(Taplin, 2006) 
 
Confirming  the value  of a differentiated, high- 
value  approach is a 2006  report  highlighting 
the fact that while the majority of wine  indus- 
tries are suffering  from severe  over-supply, the 
first-growth, icon producers of Bordeaux are 
experiencing the highest demand  for many 
years.   The  latest   figures   show   that   futures 
buyers   are  demanding  2500   cases   of  2005 
Chateau  Latour, Chateau  Rothschilds and Haut 
Brion at approximately $6500 a case and 
receiving fewer  than  500  cases  due  to exces- 
sive demand  (NineMSN, 2006). This trend also 
  
 
applies with  the new  wave  wine  producers of 
Bordeaux that have adopted methods anti- 
thetical to New World  industries. Specifically, 
these   include over-pruning, extracting  ultra- 
low   yields,  extending  the   ripening  period, 
hand-picking,  hand-sorting, ageing  in  up  to 
200% French oak (cellaring in one barrel,  then 
a second  to increase the oak flavour)  and ulti- 
mately   hand-crafting  their   wines (Echikson, 
2004). The result  is a relatively small  produc- 
tion   of  elegant  wines  that   have   received 
detailed attention from the vineyard to the 
bottle  and  may  command prices of between 
$5000 and $7000 a case.  More importantly, 
however, is the reputation that such wines and 
their makers  are attracting and the localized 
branding that  results. This is where the  long- 
term,  sustained value  lies (Croser, 2006). 
 
 
A model for  region-specific R&D 
in Australia 
 
A key  factor  in regional identity is the reputa- 
tion of the product for quality and differentia- 
tion — a   reputation  that   distinguishes  the 
product and the region  from the rest of the 
market. Always  underlying this  reputation is 
the research and development that feeds  into 
the creation of that product. As Croser (2006) 
claims,  the Australian  wine  industry is under 
greater pressure for innovation and export 
market   development  in   the   face   of  over- 
supply.  According to  the  wine   firms  them- 
selves,  this development must take the form of 
region-specific extension. 
An appropriate model for such an extension 
is the  one  cited  in  this  study  that  builds  on 
current innovation frameworks and infrastruc- 
ture. As it is an extension of an existing model 
it also  reduces the  element of perceived risk 
that is currently locking the industry into 
defined  R&D pathways (Aylward, 2006b). 
Specifically, the model would  provide  for a 
framework for the Australian Wine Research 
Institute, which conducts approximately 90% 
of the industry’s applied research and a signifi- 
cant  amount  of its basic  research. 
This   extended  framework  would   involve 
‘hub  and spoke’ extension, in which the AWRI 
would  receive industry research funding  as it 
does  now  but  rather   than  allocating from  a 
central pool, would reallocate to regional wine- 
making  and grape-grower associations. Alloca- 
tion would  be determined by the region’s firm 
population, its perceived need,  the type  of 
research requested, the strength of the cluster 
and branding and the perceived capacity of the 
firms  to  absorb  the  R&D (Visser,  2004). The 
prescribed funding  allocation would  include 
resources for appropriately qualified person- 
nel, education and infrastructure at each of the 
association sites,  which would, in effect, 
become R&D nodes. These  nodes  would  be 
responsible for regional R&D governance as 
well  as  the  management of R&D supply and 
demand. Their interests would  be in alignment 
with  those  of their  subscriber firms  and  the 
region  in which they  are located. There would 
be substantially less duplication in R&D type as 
the  nodes   would   operate  according  to 
regional, rather  than central, mandates. 
This type  of model  would  ensure a number 
of additional improvements. First, R&D exten- 
sion would  become more flexible and respon- 
sive,  as  intimate collaboration between  the 
nodes  and their  subscriber firms would  allow 
for constant adjustment to R&D flow.  Second, 
the decentralization to node level would  allow 
greater  ownership  by  subscriber  firms  and 
more  interactive  decision-making — an  issue 
that  registered strongly in  the  survey. Third, 
the two above improvements would  create 
greater efficiencies in R&D delivery and 
enhance R&D planning ability  for regional ini- 
tiatives. Most importantly, the R&D node 
initiative would  support regional branding and 
identity to a much  greater extent than  exists 
currently. This would in turn disrupt  the path 
dependency of the industry’s innovation 
framework, thus reducing a tendency towards 
lock-in  or  inertia. The  primary  objective  of 
such  a model  and  the  measure of its success 
would  be a realignment of industry organiza- 
tion  and  firm  imperatives. Only  by  reducing 
the inertial gap between these imperatives can 
R&D extension truly  contribute to  competi- 
tive  advantage at price-points other  than  that 





A new  and very differently configured wine 
landscape is beginning to emerge. It is a land- 
scape  that  transcends national borders  and  is 
punctuated by international wine  conglomer- 
ates. In what would seem a paradox, these con- 
glomerates have,  at  one  level,   homogenized 
much  of the industry product within the bulk 
and popular-premium categories. They  have 
streamlined distribution, created flexible 
production points,  purchased geographically 
diverse vineyards and standardized viticulture 
practices. At another  level, their transcendence 
of national borders  has created unique and pre- 
viously  unlikely nexi  of global–local interests. 
As national borders  and therefore national 
approaches  become  less   relevant,  regional 
wine  clusters are responding directly to these 
global  pressures — specifically, pressures for 
differentiated products at the higher  price- 
points in world  markets. While a homogenized 
product  is   demanded  and   easily    satisfied 
within popular price  categories, it is the more 
discerning price-points within mature  markets 
that  require the  differentiation, heritage and 
stories  that many  regional SME producers can 
supply. 
Regional    clustering  provides  the   critical 
mass  which firms need  for distribution chan- 
nels and shelf space. But just as importantly, it 
allows  for more streamlined supply chains, 
superior  networking,   knowledge   spill-over 
and, most of all, branding of the region  and its 
differentiated products. What these  regional 
clusters currently lack,  however, is the region- 
specific R&D extension that  would   support 
such  advantages. While  it  appears that  wine 
firms  across  major  regions are  reconfiguring 
their production, marketing and distribution 
operations to align  with  shifting  paradigms of 
the global market, their industry organizations 
are  responding to discordant imperatives. 
These imperatives derive  from the industry’s 
prefabricated ‘2025  vision’,  which mandates a 
national approach to branding, R&D, market- 
ing and distribution. The resulting inertial gap 
between the two sets of imperatives threatens 
to   undermine  the   industry’s  capacity  for 
change. Without  change, the Australian  wine 
industry will lock itself into what  Brian Croser 
(2006) describes as ‘a race to the bottom’. The 
potential to  create a  truly  differentiated 
product will  be lost for many,  if not most pro- 
ducers, as their  growing reputation for com- 
modity wine  precedes them. If imperatives are 
aligned and change allowed, however, the 
Australian  wine  industry may recapture its 




David Aylward  is  the  Research Manager  for 
the Faculty  of Commerce at the University of 
Wollongong in New South Wales, Australia. 
David has been  carrying out a range  of inno- 
vation  and  internationalization-related pro- 
jects  with  the  Australian  wine  industry. As a 
result  of these  projects he has worked closely 
with  a large  number  of industry stakeholders 





Anderson M. 2005.  Dynamics  of industry and 
innovation: organizations, networks and systems. 
DRUID, 10th  Anniversary Summer  Conference, 
Copenhagen, pp.  2–6. 
Aylward    D.   2004.    Innovation–export   linkages 
within  different   cluster  models: a  case   study 
from  the Australian  wine  industry. Prometheus 
22(4): 423–437. 
Aylward  D. 2005.  Global landscapes: a speculative 
assessment of emerging organizational struc- 
tures within the international wine  industry. 
Prometheus 23(4): 421–436. 
Aylward  D. 2006a. Global pipelines: profiling  suc- 
cessful  SME exporters within the Australian  wine 
industry. International Journal  of Technology, 
Policy and Management 6(1): 49–65. 
Aylward   D. 2006b. SME innovation within the 
Australian    wine    industry:  a   cluster  analysis. 
Small Enterprise Research 41(1). 
Aylward  D. Forthcoming. Fault lines:  emerging 
domains  of inertia  within the Australian  wine 
industry. Prometheus. 
Boschma R. 2004.  Some reflections on regional 
innovation policy. Export  Group  Meeting  on 
Constructed Regional  Advantage, Brussels. 
  
 
Brook S (ed.). 2000.  A Century of Wine: The Story 
of a Wine Revolution. Octopus  Publishing 
Group: London. 
Brown G. 2002. Why change a good thing? Un- 
published work,  University of British Columbia, 
pp.  1–10. 
Croser  B. 2004.  Brand or authenticity. Australian 
and  New Zealand  Wine   Industry  Journal: 
12–22. 
Croser  B. 2006.  Waxing and  whining. Masters  of 
Wine  Conference, Napa Valley,  June. 
DiMaggio  P,  Powell  W.  1991.  The  iron  cage   re- 
visited:  institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields. In The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 
DiMaggio  P, Powell  W (eds). The  University  of 
Chicago  Press:  Chicago. 
Ditter  J. 2005.  Reforming  the  French  wine  indus- 
try:  could  clusters work?  Cahirs du Ceren 13: 
39–54. 
Echikson  W.  2004.  Noble  Rot:  A  Bordeaux Wine 
Revolution. WW Norton & Co.: UK. 
Foxon T, Pearson  P. 2006.  Policy process for low 
carbon  innovation in the UK: successes, failures 
and lessons.  Environmental Economy and Policy 
Research Working  Papers,  University of 
Cambridge. 
Genschel  P. 1997. The dynamics of inertia: institu- 
tional persistence and change in telecommuni- 
cations   and   health   care.   Governance  10(1): 
43–46. 
Greenwood R, Hinnings C. 1996.  Understanding 
radical  organizational change: bringing together 
the  old and  the  new  institutionalism. Academy 
of Management Review 21(4): 1025–1035. 
GWRDC.  2004.   Grape   and  Wine   Research  and 
Development  Corporation Annual  Report,   pp. 
2–15. 
GWRDC.  2005.   Grape   and  Wine   Research  and 
Development  Corporation Annual  Report,   pp. 
2–15. 
Hannan M, Freeman  J. 1984.  Structural inertia  and 
organizational change. American Sociological 
Review 49:  149–160. 
Hannan M, Polos L, Carroll  G. 2004.  Cascading 
organizational change. Organization Science 14: 
463–482. 
Harrison B, Kelley R, Grant J. 1996.  Innovative firm 
behaviour and local  lieu:  exploring the intersec- 
tion of agglomeration, firm effects,  and techno- 
logical   change. Economic  Geography   72(3): 
233–253. 
Lundvall B. 1988.  Innovation  as an interactive 
process: from user–producer interaction to the 
national  system   of  innovation.  In  Technical 
Change and Economic Theory,  Dosi  G (ed.). 
Pinter  Publishers: London. 
MacQuitty  J. 2006.  Aussies  lacking a middle  order. 
Available  at www.timesonline.co.uk [Accessed 2 
July 2006]. 
NineMSN. 2006.  BordeauxNews. Available  at 
http://groups.msn.com/BordeauxCentral/winet 
alk.msnw?action=get_message&ID_Message=75 
61&ShowDelete=0&CDir=-2 [Accessed   1   July 
2006]. 
Park S, Lee S. 2004. The national and regional inno- 
vation systems in Finland: from the path depen- 
dency  to the  path  creation approach. Artificial 
Intelligence and Society 19(2): 180–195. 
Pierson  P. 2000.  Limits of design: explaining insti- 
tutional  origins  and change. Governance 13(4): 
475–499. 
Ruef M. 2004.  For whom  the  bell  tolls:  ecological 
perspectives on industrial decline and resur- 
gence. Industrial and Corporate Change 13(1): 
61–89. 
Sanders  M.  2005.   Families  of the Vine.  Bantam 
Books: London. 
Sands  R. 2006.  Constellation Annual  Report,  New 
York, pp.  1–7. 
Sydney  Morning  Herald. 2006. Australian  wine 
industry told to change. 
Taplin I. 2006.  Competitive pressures and strategic 
repositioning  in  the  California   premium wine 
industry. International Journal  of Wine  Mar- 
keting 18(1): 67. 
Visser E. 2004. A Chilean  wine  cluster? The quality 
and importance of local governance in a fast 
growing and internationalizing industry. 
Winemakers’ Federation  of Australia.  2006.  Intro- 
duction. Available  at www.wfa.org.au/intro.htm 
[Accessed 26 July 2006]. 
Winetitles.   2006.    The    Australian    and  New 
Zealand Wine Industry Directory, 23rd  edn. 
Winetitles: Adelaide. 
Wittwer G. 2006.  Quality  the  key  to global  wine 
market. Available  at www.monash.edu.au/news/ 
newsline/story/806 [Accessed 12 July 2006]. 
